Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.(B.) to the Party organizations.

Comrades, one of the most critical moments, even probably the most critical, for the socialist revolution has arrived. Those who defend the exploiters, the landlords and capitalists, their Russian and foreign defenders – first of all the British and French – make desperate attempts to re-establish in Russia the power of the landlords and exploiters, the plunderers of the people's labour, to consolidate their power, which is collapsing all over the world. The British and French capitalists failed in their plan to conquer the Ukraine by means of their own troops; failed in their support of Kolchak in Siberia; the Red Army, advancing heroically in the Urals with the help of the workers of that region, who are taking up arms as one man, is approaching Siberia in order to free it from the unprecedented yoke and ferocity of the capitalists, masters and masters of that region. Finally, the British and French imperialists also failed in their plan to seize Petrograd by means of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy in which Russian monarchists, Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialists participated, not excluding the Left Soviets.

Now the foreign capitalists are making desperate attempts to restore the yoke of capital by means of the expedition led by Denijin, just as they did to Kolchak, by supplying him with officers, supplying him with material, ammunition, tanks, etc., etc.

All the forces of the workers and peasants, all the forces of the Soviet Republic, must exert themselves in order to repel and defeat Denikin, without suspending the victorious offensive of the Red Army on the Urals and Siberia. That is the task of the moment.

All Communists, above all and above all, all sympathizers, all honest workers and peasants, all workers of the Soviet organizations, must put themselves on a war footing in order to devote the maximum of their work, their efforts and concerns to the immediate tasks of the war, to the task of rapidly repelling Denikin's expedition by reducing and reorganising the war. subordinating all other activities to this task.

 

The Soviet Republic is besieged by its enemies and must become, not in words, but in deeds, a single military camp.

All the activity of all institutions must be adapted to the needs of the war and reorganized in a military manner!

Collective leadership in the management of the affairs of the workers' and peasants' state is indispensable. But every exaggeration of this collective leadership, every denaturalization of it, leading to useless delays, to irresponsibility, every transformation of collective institutions into chat circles [1] is the worst of the evils with which we must put an end at all costs, as soon as possible and without noticing anything.

As for the number of members in the governing councils and in relation to the concrete management of affairs, the collective leadership must not go further than what is absolutely indispensable, to suppress "speeches", to speed up the exchange of opinions, reducing it to mutual information and precise practical propositions.

Whenever there is the slightest possibility, collective leadership should be reduced to a very brief deliberation of questions, dealing only with the most important ones, and in the most restricted council possible, while the practical management of the institution, the enterprise, the work, the task, should be entrusted to a single comrade, known for his firmness and energy, for his courage and ability to direct concrete matters, and who enjoys the greatest confidence. In all cases and in all circumstances, without exception, collective leadership must be accompanied by the strictest personal responsibility, which will assume eachone for the fulfillment of a precisely defined task. Lack of responsibility, covered up under the pretext of collective leadership, is the most dangerous evil which threatens all those who do not have a great deal of experience in collective practical work, and which in the military field leads continually and inevitably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, plurality of powers, and defeat.

A no less dangerous evil is inconstancy, improvisation in matters of organization. The reorganization of labor, which is indispensable for war, must in no case lead to the reorganization of institutions, much less to the hasty creation of new ones. This is absolutely unacceptable, it only leads to chaos. The reorganization of work must consist in the temporal enclosure of institutions that are not absolutely indispensable, or in the reduction to a certain extent of their personnel. But all the work of aid to the war must be carried out entirely and exclusively through the existing military institutions, through their reform and strengthening, expansion and support. The formation of special "defence committees" or "revolutionary" or "revolutionary-military committees" is permissible only and in the first place as an exception; secondly, only with the approval of the corresponding military authorities or the supreme authorities of the Soviets; thirdly, with the mandatory fulfillment of said condition.

Explaining to the people the truth about Kolchak and Denikin

Kolchak and Denikin are the main enemies and the only serious enemies of the Soviet Republic. Without the help the Entente lends them (England, France, the United States), they would have sunk long ago. Only the help of the Entente makes them a force. However, they are compelled to deceive the people by pretending from time to time to be supporters of "democracy", of the "Constituent Assembly", of the "people's government", etc. The Mensheviks and Serists are very willingly deceived.

Now the truth about Kolchak (and Denikin is his twin brother) is completely laid bare: the shooting of tens of thousands of workers, including Mensheviks and Socialists; beating of peasants in entire districts; public harassment of women; absolute arbitrariness of the officials, of the landlords; endless looting. Such is the truth about Kolchak and Denikin. Even among the Mensheviks and Serists, who betrayed the workers by going to the camp of Kolchak and Denikin, there is an increasing number of those who are compelled to admit this truth.

It is necessary to make it the main task of all agitation and propaganda to inform the people of these facts. It must be explained that either Kolchak and Denikin remain, or Soviet power, the power (dictatorship) of the workers, remains. There is no middle ground and there can be. Above all, we must make use of testimonies which do not come from the Bolsheviks, but from Mensheviks, Socialists and non-party members, who have been in territory occupied by Kolchak or Denikin. Let every worker and peasant know what he is fighting for and what awaits him if Kolchak or Denikin wins.

Work among those called to the ranks

One of the main concerns now must be the work to be done among the calls to the ranks, to help the mobilization, and the work among those already mobilized. Communists and sympathizers everywhere where the mobilized are concentrated or where there are garrisons, especially battalions of reservists, etc., must all be brought to their feet. All of them, without exception, must unite and work – some daily, others, for example, four or eight hours a week – in aid of the mobilization and among the mobilized and the soldiers of the local garrison, it being understood that they will do so in a rigorously organized manner, each of them assigned to a suitable work by the local organization of the party and by the military authorities.

The non-Party or those who belong to any party other than the Communist Party will of course not be in a position to carry out any ideological work against Denikin or Kolchak. But that doesn't mean they should be exempted from all the work. It is necessary to seek all possible ways to ensure that the whole population (and, in the first place, the wealthiest in town and country) is compelled to contribute their pence, in one way or another, to the work of helping the mobilization or the mobilized.

Among the measures of aid there must be a special category, that of helping by a speedier and better instruction of those mobilized. The Soviet government is calling into the ranks all ex-officers, non-commissioned officers, etc. The Communist Party, and with it all sympathisers and workers, must come to the aid of the workers' and peasants' state, firstly, by doing everything possible to find out those ex-officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., who evade coming forward, and, secondly, by forming, under the control of the Party organisation, and attached to it, groups made up of those who, theoretically and practically (for example, because they participated in the imperialist war), have completed military training and are able to contribute their share of usefulness.

Work among deserters

Lately there has been a clear turning point in the struggle against the deserters. In many provinces deserters have begun to rejoin the army en masse, and it can be said without exaggeration that deserters flock to the ranks of the Red Army. The reason for this is, in the first place, that the militant comrades of our Party carry out skilful and systematic work; and, secondly, that the peasants are more and more convinced that Kolchak and Denikin are signifying the establishment of a regime even worse than the tsarist one, the restoration of slavery for the workers and peasants, the system of beatings, plundering and trampling by the officers and gentlemen of the nobility.

That is why it is necessary to strengthen work among deserters everywhere and by all means and to achieve their reincorporation into the army. This is one of the primary and most immediate tasks.

By the way, the possibility of influencing the deserters by persuasion and the success of this work show that the workers' state, unlike the state of the landlords and capitalists, maintains a very special attitude towards the peasants. The yoke of garrote and hunger is the only source of discipline for these last two types of State. On the contrary, for the workers' state, i.e., for the dictatorship of the proletariat, there is another source of discipline: the persuasion of the peasantry by the workers and the fraternal alliance between them. When one hears eyewitness testimony that in one or another province (for example, in that of Riazan) thousands of deserters are voluntarily reincorporated, that at the meetings calling the "comrade deserters" there is sometimes an indescribable success, one begins to get an idea of how great are the forces not yet utilized by us. which ends this fraternal alliance of the workers and peasants. The peasant suffers from a prejudice which leads him to the capitalist; even the eserista, in favor of "free trade"; But the peasant also has a sound sense which leads him more and more into alliance with the workers.

Direct aid to the Army

What our Army needs most is [supplies]: clothing, footwear, weapons, ammunition. In a ruined country we are obliged to make enormous efforts to cover these needs of the army, while the only thing that saves Kolchak and Denikin from an inevitable debacle which would produce insufficient supplies is the aid abundantly provided by the plunder-capitalists of Britain, France and the United States.

However, however ruined Russia is, it still has a great deal of resources which we have not used, which we have often not been able to use. There are still many undiscovered or unrevised stores of war material, many possibilities of production, often unused, partly because of the conscious sabotage of the officials, partly because of the delaying procedures, the workshop routine, the disorder and turpitude, all those "sins of the past" which so inevitably and cruelly weigh on every revolution that makes a "leap" to a new social system.

Direct assistance to the Army in this field is especially important. The institutions responsible for it have a special need to be "refreshed", to obtain outside co-operation and to rely on the voluntary, energetic and heroic initiative of the workers and peasants in the localities where they are based.

We must exhort all class-conscious workers and peasants, all active collaborators in the Soviets, to make this initiative manifestly possible; it is necessary to rehearse in different places and in different terrains the most varied forms of assistance to the Army in this direction. Here "revolutionary style work" is done on a much smaller scale than in other fields, while the need for "revolutionary style work" is much greater here.

One of the integral parts of this work is to collect weapons from the civilian population. In a country that has survived four years of imperialist war, and then two popular revolutions, it is natural and inevitable that the bourgeoisie and the peasants should conceal a great many weapons. But now, in the face of Denikin's menacing crusade, this phenomenon must be combated by all means. Anyone who conceals or helps to conceal weapons commits the greatest crime against the workers and peasants and deserves to be shot, for he is guilty of the death of thousands and thousands of the best Red fighters, who often succumb just because they do not have enough weapons at the front.

The Petrograd comrades were able to find thousands upon thousands of rifles by making – in a strictly organized way – large-scale records. The rest of Russia must not be left behind, but must achieve this Petrograd feat and overtake it, whatever the cost.

Everywhere there is no doubt that most of the time the rifles were concealed by the peasants, and very often without any ill intentions, but simply moved by inveterate distrust of all "state organization," etc. If we have been able to do a great deal, a great deal (in the best provinces) by persuasion, by skilful agitation, by approaching things properly, in order to get the deserters to return voluntarily to the Red Army, there is no reason to doubt that the same can and must be done, if not more, to have the arms voluntarily returned.

Workers and peasants! Search for the hidden rifles and hand them over to the Army! With them you will save yourself from being run over, beaten en masse, plundered and shot by Kolchak and Denikin!

Reduce non-military work

In order to carry out even partially the work outlined above, new and new cadres are needed, who are, moreover, the most secure, faithful and energetic among the Communists. And where to get them from, given the general complaints about the scarcity of such cadres and their excessive tiredness?

There is no doubt that these complaints are largely justified. If one were to calculate exactly how small was the section of advanced workers and Communists who, with the support and sympathy of the mass of workers and peasants, have been governing Russia for the past 20 months, the result might seem quite implausible. And yet we have led the country with immense success, creating socialism, overcoming unheard-of difficulties, overcoming the enemies who have arisen everywhere and who were directly or indirectly linked with the bourgeoisie. And we have already defeated all the enemies except one: the Entente, the imperialist bourgeoisie of Britain, France and the United States, the bourgeoisie of world power, although we have already destroyed one of its arms: Kolchak; now only threatens us with his other arm: Denikin.

The new workers' forces called upon to lead the state, to fulfil the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are growing rapidly: it is the young workers and peasants who devote themselves to study with ever more passion, enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, directing the new impressions of the new regime, freeing themselves from the crust of the old prejudices, the capitalist and bourgeois-democratic prejudices. and forges in its bosom communists even firmer than those of the old generation.

But however rapid the growth of this new sector may be, however rapidly it may learn and mature under the fire of civil war and the furious resistance of the bourgeoisie, it will not be able to provide us with cadres prepared for the leadership of the state in the coming months. And it is precisely the approaching months of the summer and autumn of 1919, since it is indispensable to decide on the struggle against Denikin and to decide it immediately.

In order to obtain the large number of trained cadres necessary to strengthen military work, it is necessary to reduce a whole series of branches and institutions of the Soviet apparatus which are not military, and to reorganize in this direction (i.e., in the direction of reduction) all those institutions and enterprises which are not absolutely indispensable.

Take, for example, the scientific-technical section of the Supreme Council of National Economy. It is a supremely useful institution, indispensable for the complete construction of socialism, for carrying out statistics and a correct distribution of all scientific and technical forces. But is an institution like this absolutely necessary? Of course not. To devote to it men who can and must be used immediately in the demanding and absolutely indispensable Communist work in the Armydirectly for the army would be a real crime at this time.

In the center and on the periphery of our country we have a considerable number of institutions and delegations of this type. Aspiring to realize socialism completely, we could not fail to undertake the immediate organization of such institutions. But we would be fools or criminals if, in the face of Denikin's threatening expedition, we did not know how to reorganize our ranks in such a way that everything that is not of an absolutely indispensable character is paralyzed and reduced.

Without falling into panic or chaos in the field of organization, we should not restructure or suppress any company at all, nor should we begin to create new institutions, which is particularly harmful when working in a hurry and in a hurry. We must suspend for three, four or five months the work of all the institutions and their sections, in the center and in the periphery, which are not absolutely indispensable; and if this is not possible, reduce them for approximately the same period, reduce their work as much as possible, that is, leave only the minimum of absolutely essential work.

Since our main aim is to have at once a large number of Communists or sympathizers of socialism who are trained for military work, who are specialists, faithful and tested, we can risk temporarily leaving without a Communist many of the institutions (or their sections) whose work we have considerably reduced, leaving them in the hands of collaborators who come exclusively from the bourgeoisie. The risk is not great, since it is only a question of institutions that are not absolutely necessary, and the damage caused by the reduction of their (semi-paralyzed) activities, even if it exists, will be insignificant and by no means disastrous, while the lack of forces to intensify military work, to intensify immediately and considerably, may cause our ruin. It is necessary to understand it clearly and draw all the necessary conclusions.

If each of the leaders of the departments or of their provincial or county delegations, etc., if each Communist cell, without wasting a moment, asked himself: "Is this or that institution, this or that section, absolutely indispensable? Would we sink if we paralyzed its work or reduced it by nine-tenths, leaving it without any Communists?" Yes, if we think in this way, the question is quickly and energetically reduced, the Communists (together with their irreproachably loyal collaborators are withdrawn from the ranks of sympathizers or non-Party members), and in the short term we shall be able to obtain hundreds and hundreds of workers for the political sections of the army, for the posts of commissars, etc. And then we shall have a great chance of defeating Denikin. how we beat Kolchak, who was stronger.

Work in the areas near the front

During the last few weeks the immediate areas at the front, within the boundaries of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, have been very extensive and have undergone exceptionally rapid exchanges. This presages or accompanies the decisive moment of the war, the proximity of its outcome.

On the one hand, the huge area near the front near the Urals and the Urals has become our own area next to it thanks to the victories of the Red Army, the collapse of Kolchak and the growth of the revolution in the territories occupied by Kolchak. On the other hand, an adjacent and still more extensive zone was formed in the vicinity of Petrograd and in the south, because of the enemy's close approach to Petrograd and the invasion from the south into the Ukraine and central Russia.

Work in these areas is of particular importance.

In the region near the Urals, where the Red Army is advancing rapidly, among the political cadres of the army, commissars, members of the political sections, etc., and even among the workers and peasants of those places, there arises a natural desire to settle in the recovered villages and to carry out Soviet construction work there. This is a desire that is all the more natural the greater the weariness of war and the more horrendous the picture of the devastation caused by Kolchak. But nothing is more dangerous than the satisfaction of such a desire. This would threaten to weaken the offensive, halt it, and increase the chances that Kolchak would pull himself together. For our part, it would be a real crime in the face of the revolution.

Under no circumstances should not a single one of its workers be withdrawn from the Eastern Army above what is necessary for local tasks! (Without extreme necessity, in general, these cadres should not be removed, but on the contrary, those from the central regions should be sent there!) The offensive must not be weakened in any way! The only way to achieve complete victory is to take part in the struggle of the entire population of the region surrounding the Urals and the Urals themselves, a population which knows the horrors of Kolchak's "democracy", and to continue the offensive on Siberia until the complete victory of the revolution there.

That the construction in the area near the Urals and the Urals should be delayed and less sound because it is carried out feebly, by purely local young and inexperienced forces: we will not perish for that. But to weaken the offensive against the Urals and Siberia is tantamount to perishing; we must strengthen this offensive with the forces of the workers in revolt in the Urals and of the peasants in the immediate Ural regions, who know firsthand what the "constitutionalist" promises of the Menshevik Maisky and the Chernov writer mean, and know what their real content is, i.e., Kolchak.

To weaken the offensive on the Urals and Siberia would be to betray the revolution, to betray the cause of liberating the workers and peasants from the yoke of Kolchak.

Working in the areas near the front, areas which have just been liberated, it must be remembered that the main task there is to gain confidence for the Soviet power, not only the confidence of the workers, but also of the peasants; to explain to them with deeds the essence of Soviet power as the power of the workers and peasants; to take from the beginning the correct course learned by the Party on the basis of the experience of twenty months of work. We must not repeat in the Urals the mistakes sometimes made in central Russia, mistakes which we have quickly learned not to repeat.

In the area near the front, near Petrograd, and in the vast area which has spread rapidly and so threateningly in the Ukraine and in the South, everything must be put on a war footing, completely subordinating all work, all efforts, all thoughts to war, and to war alone. Otherwise one cannot reject Denikin's invasion. That is self-evident and we must understand it clearly and put it fully into practice.

Let us indicate at once that a peculiarity of Denikin's army consists in the abundance of officers and Cossacks. These are elements which, without relying on a mass force, are very capable of giving quick blows of the hand, of launching themselves into adventures and desperate enterprises, in order to sow panic and destroy everything for the pleasure of destroying.

In the struggle against such an enemy, military discipline and vigilance must be raised to the maximum. Lack of vigilance or disorder would throw everything away. Every responsible Party and Soviet militant must bear this in mind.

Military discipline in military affairs and in all other matters!

Military vigilance and severity, firmness in the application of all precautionary measures!

The attitude towards the professional military

The monstrous plot begun at Krasnaya Gorka, which was intended to surrender Petrograd, pleads with special insistence on the question of professional military personnel and combating counter-revolution in the rear. There is no doubt that the worsening of the military situation and of supplies will inevitably provoke, and will continue to provoke in the near future, the intensification of counter-revolutionary attempts (the Petrograd plot involved the Union for the Resurgence of Russia, the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the Right Soviets; the Left Soviets also participated, though only a few). It is equally unquestionable that in the near future the professional military will produce a high percentage of traitors, the same as the kulaks, the bourgeois intellectuals, the Mensheviks and the Socialists.

But it would be an irreparable mistake and an unpardonable lack of character to plead for such a reason the question of changing the basis of our military policy. They betray us and will continue to betray hundreds and hundreds of professional soldiers, whom we will discover and flog. but thousands and tens of thousands of professional soldiers have been working with us systematically and for a long time, without whom the Red Army could not have been formed, which has already overcome the period of indiscipline of cursed memory and has learned to achieve brilliant victories in the East. Expert men who head our War Department rightly point out that where the most rigorous application of the Party's policy on professional military personnel and the extirpation of the spirit of indiscipline is being carried out; where discipline is firmer, where political work among the troops and the activity of the commissars are carried out with the greatest care, there are, in short, fewer professional soldiers willing to betray, fewer possibilities for those who want to do so to carry out their aims; where there is no indolence in the army; Their formations and morale are better and it is where we get the most victories. The spirit of indiscipline, its traces, remnants and survivals have caused our army and that of the Ukraine many more clamies, greater disintegration, more defeats, catastrophes, casualties and losses of war material than all the betrayals of the professional military.

Our Party's programme, both with regard to the question of bourgeois specialists in general, and in particular with regard to one of its varieties, the professional military, has determined the policy of the Communist Party with complete accuracy. Our Party fights and will continue to "fight relentlessly against the pseudo-radical presumption, which in reality is nothing but ignorance, that the workers will be able to defeat capitalism and the bourgeois regime without learning from the bourgeois specialists, without using them and without spending a long school of work side by side with them."

From this it is clear that, at the same time, the party will not have "even the slightest political concession to this bourgeois stratum"; The party represses and will "relentlessly repress all its counterrevolutionary attempts". It is natural that when such "attempts" are discovered or outlined with a greater or lesser degree of probabilities, their "implacable repression" requires other qualities than the calm spirit and prudence of the student, typical of a "long school" and which this educates in people. The contradiction between the attitude of the men engaged in the "long school of work alongside" of the professional military and that of those who are enthusiastic about the immediate task of "ruthlessly suppressing the counter-revolutionary attempts" of the professional soldiers could easily and does lead to harshness and conflict. The same applies to the necessary personnel transfers, which sometimes affect a large number of professional soldiers, a measure occasioned by this or that case of counterrevolutionary "attempts" and, even more so, of important conspiracies.

We have resolved and will continue to resolve these conflicts through the Party, demanding the same from all Party organizations, and insisting that the slightest detriment in practical work, no delay in carrying out the necessary measures, and no wavering in the application of the established principles of our military policy be tolerated.

If some Party organs allow the professional military to be treated in a false tone (as happened a little while ago in Petrograd) or if in some cases the "criticism" of the professional military degenerates into an obvious obstacle to the systematic and tenacious work connected with their use, the Party corrects it on the spot and will correct these errors.

The main and fundamental means of correcting them is to intensify political work in the army and among those subject to mobilization, to strengthen the work of the commissars in the army, to improve their composition and training; in which the commissars actually carry out what the Party Programme demands and which is too often very poorly fulfilled, namely: "concentration of extensive control over the cadres of command of the army in the hands of the working class". Criticism of the professional military from the outside, the attempts to correct things by means of assaults is too easy a work and, therefore, doomed to failure and harmful. All those who feel their political responsibility, all those who look with sorrow upon the defects of our army, let them join its ranks as Red soldiers or commands, as political delegates or commissars, let everyone work within the military organisation – every member of the Party will find a function in it according to his aptitudes – to improve it.

The Soviet government has long been taking greater care to ensure that the workers, and then the peasants, and especially the Communists, should be able to study the military art seriously. This is done in a series of establishments, institutions, courses, etc., but it is still far from being sufficient. Personal initiative, personal energy must still do much in this direction. Communists must learn with special application the handling of machine guns, artillery, armoured cars, etc., since in this field our backwardness is more noticeable, and here the superiority of the enemy, who has a large number of officers, is more considerable; in this field, a disloyal professional soldier can cause us great harm; Here the role of the communist is extremely important.

Fighting the counterrevolution in the rear

Just as in July of last year, the counterrevolution raises its head in our rear, among us.

The counter-revolution – defeated, but still far from being annihilated – takes advantage, of course, of Denikin's victories and the worsening of the supply crisis. And then the direct and open counter-revolution, then the Black Hundreds and the Cadets, and they are strong because of their capital, because of their immediate links with the imperialism of the Entente, because they understand the inevitability of dictatorship and because of their ability to carry it out (in the style of Kolchak), behind them, as always, are the vacillators, the false of character, the Mensheviks and Eserists of the Right and Left, who cover up their actions with fine phrases.

There is no room for any illusion about this! We know the "favourable environment" which engenders counter-revolutionary attempts, riots, conspiracies, etc. We know it only too well. It is the mood of the bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois intellectuals, of the kulaks in the countryside, and of the "non-Party" elements everywhere, and moreover that of the Socialists and Mensheviks. It is necessary to extreme and multiply vigilance, because counter-revolutionary attempts on this side are absolutely inevitable, precisely at the present moment and in the immediate future. In this environment it is very natural that repeated attempts are made to blow up points, organize strikes, espionage machinations of all kinds, etc. All precautionary measures, the most energetic, systematic, repeated, wide-ranging and unexpected, are absolutely indispensable in all centers where there is the slightest possibility of this "breeding ground" of counterrevolutionaries.

With regard to the Mensheviks and Socialists of the Right and Left, the latest experience must be taken into account. On their "periphery," among the public sympathetic to them, there is undoubtedly a tendency to turn away from Kolchak and Denikin in order to move closer to Soviet power. We have taken this fact into account, and every time it has manifested itself in something real, we have taken a certain step towards it. We will not modify this policy in any way; and the number of "fugitives" who are leaving the camp of the Mensheviks and Soviet-leaning Mensheviks and Socialists who are leaning towards Soviet power will undoubtedly increase, broadly speaking.

But at the present time the petty-bourgeois democracy, headed by the Socialists and Mensheviks, as always lacking in character and indecisive, rises in the warmest sun and bends down to the victor, to Denikin. This is especially true of the "political leaders" of the Left Soviets, the Mensheviks (such as Martov and Co.), the Right Elites (such as Chernov and Co.), and their "literary groups" in general, whose members are moreover profoundly aggravated by their complete political bankruptcy, and therefore there is only the possibility of repaying them for their "inclination" to adventure against Soviet power.