Western media, bourgeois academia, and anti-communist institutions have long promoted a simplistic and deeply flawed depiction of Democratic Kampuchea—one that relies less on empirical investigation than on emotional reflex and political expedience. Among the most persistent accusations are that the CPK abolished money and markets as an act of ideological zealotry, pursued the extermination of intellectuals, and sought to return society to a mythical pre-industrial agrarian past. These myths have gained such traction that they are often repeated without question, becoming part of the ideological background noise of Cold War historiography.

Yet a sober, materialist analysis—rooted in the concrete realities of Kampuchean history—reveals a far more complex picture, one in which the leadership of the CPK made difficult and often improvised decisions in response to the catastrophic legacies of colonialism, U.S. imperialist war, and domestic economic collapse. The following analysis aims to dispel three central myths that continue to obscure the real historical and political experience of Democratic Kampuchea.

From Bomb Craters to Socialist Reconstruction

Understanding Democratic Kampuchea requires grounding it in the social and material conditions from which it emerged. Between 1969 and 1973, the United States conducted one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in human history over Cambodia, dropping over half a million tons of ordnance on rural areas. Whole villages were obliterated, agricultural production was shattered, and hundreds of thousands were killed or displaced.

This was not merely a military operation—it was the deliberate destruction of a society’s economic and physical infrastructure. By the time the revolutionary forces liberated the capital, the country was in ruins. There was no functioning monetary economy, industrial capacity had been pulverized, and administrative institutions were paralyzed or nonexistent.

In these extreme conditions, the CPK was faced with the challenge not of reforming a functioning state, but of rebuilding a shattered nation from scratch. The standard tools of economic development and governance were no longer available. A new form of socialist reconstruction had to be invented on the ground, under siege, and in the shadow of annihilation.

Myth 1: The "Abolition" of Money and the Destruction of the National Bank

A widely circulated claim holds that the CPK dynamited the Bank of Kampuchea as a symbolic act of eradicating capitalism, and by extension, abolished money altogether. This claim, though often repeated in Western literature, rests on very shaky foundations.

The reality is that by the early 1970s, in most areas under revolutionary control, money had already ceased to function as a meaningful medium of exchange. Inflation, wartime disruption, and isolation from urban centers had rendered the riel virtually useless. Trade increasingly took the form of barter, communal distribution, or state rationing. When the CPK took Phnom Penh, it inherited not a capitalist economy but an economic void.

The claim that the Bank of Kampuchea was destroyed also appears unfounded. A Soviet documentary from 1979 (Spring in Phnom Penh) reveals that the vaults of the bank remained intact well after the fall of Democratic Kampuchea, with banknotes scattered throughout the facility. If the leadership had in fact abolished money as a matter of dogma, this would be a curious oversight.

Moreover, CPK leaders themselves indicated an interest in reintroducing money once the necessary economic base existed. In March 1976, Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary publicly acknowledged the government's intent to reestablish monetary circulation in the future. But at that time, basic commodities were so scarce that money would have had no practical function. Rationing and direct allocation of goods, based on need and labor contribution, remained the only viable mechanism for distribution during the initial recovery period.

Myth 2: A War Against Intellectuals

Perhaps the most enduring and emotionally resonant accusation leveled against Democratic Kampuchea is that it waged a systematic campaign to exterminate intellectuals. The archetype of the “man with glasses executed for being literate” has become iconic in Western narratives. Yet upon closer examination, this claim appears grossly exaggerated and ideologically motivated.

First, we must distinguish between a class-based critique of the colonial intelligentsia and indiscriminate anti-intellectualism. The CPK inherited a deeply unequal educational system that served the interests of the French colonial administration and the comprador bourgeoisie. Education was not universal, but selective—designed to produce administrators for an economy subordinated to foreign interests. The revolution's effort to restructure this system involved uprooting these privileges, not eliminating knowledge itself.

In fact, many cadres and senior officials of the CPK were themselves highly educated. Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, and others had studied in France; countless local officials were literate and technically skilled. Glasses were hardly a death sentence—many party members wore them, and skilled professionals such as engineers, doctors, and technicians were actively sought out and assigned to vital roles in rebuilding national infrastructure.

The CPK's policy toward former professionals was complex. While some were mistrusted—especially those linked to the old regime—many were integrated into new work units and training programs. Tragically, the harsh conditions of the time—food shortages, disease, poor sanitation—did lead to significant mortality, including among urban evacuees and educated personnel. But these deaths cannot be simplistically reduced to “anti-intellectualism.”

Myth 3: Deindustrialization and Agrarian Regression

Another powerful myth asserts that Democratic Kampuchea aimed to dismantle modern industry and return the country to a primitive agrarian past. In reality, the CPK regarded industrialization as absolutely essential to national development. What critics misinterpret as “deindustrialization” was in fact a strategic regroupment under emergency conditions.

Virtually all industrial facilities in Cambodia were either destroyed or inoperable by 1975. Roads and bridges had been bombed, rail lines severed, and electrical grids rendered useless. The revolution had no choice but to rebuild from the ground up. As a result, agriculture was prioritized—not because the CPK rejected modernity, but because food security was the precondition for any future industrial development.

The Party’s official Four-Year Plan (1976–1980) made clear that the ultimate objective was a self-reliant industrial economy. Irrigation, mechanization, and the expansion of agricultural output were seen as necessary foundations. The CPK also sought foreign trade opportunities, exporting rice and timber in exchange for machinery and tools—most notably from China.

The slogan “Let us build a prosperous, modern Cambodia in 5 to 10 years” was not the fantasy of ideologues, but the concrete goal of revolutionaries trying to rebuild a sovereign economy amid near-total devastation. Had the Vietnamese invasion not occurred in late 1978, Democratic Kampuchea may well have laid the groundwork for its own form of socialist industrialization.

Toward a Materialist Understanding

The Kampuchean revolution was not perfect. Mistakes were made, contradictions abounded, and certain policies—particularly during the period of intensified internal security—did result in real suffering. But the standard portrayal of Democratic Kampuchea as a dystopian horror state is a profound distortion of history. It serves not the truth, but the political needs of imperialism and revisionism.

By perpetuating myths about money, education, and industry, anti-communist narratives deflect attention from the real historical forces that shaped revolutionary Cambodia: colonialism, war, underdevelopment, and the urgent need to reconstruct a shattered nation on socialist foundations.

To move forward, the left must reject liberal moralism and return to a method of historical materialism. This means investigating revolutionary movements not according to Western fantasies or Cold War stereotypes, but through careful study of objective conditions, class dynamics, and the strategic choices made under pressure.

Democratic Kampuchea remains one of the most misunderstood experiences of the 20th century. Clarifying its history is not merely a scholarly task—it is a political imperative for anyone committed to the liberation of the oppressed and the defense of anti-imperialist struggle.