Comrade compatriots, the People's Republic of China and the Central People's Government were founded today!

Ever since the reactionary government of Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang betrayed the motherland, conspired with imperialism and launched a counter-revolutionary war, the Chinese people have been plunged into bitter suffering.

Fortunately, our People's Liberation Army, supported by the entire nation, has fought heroically and selflessly to defend the sovereignty of our motherland, to protect the lives and belongings of the people, to relieve the people of their suffering, to fight for their rights, having finally put an end to the reactionary troops and overthrown the reactionary order of the nationalist government.

Now, the People's War of Liberation has triumphed and the majority of the people of the country have been liberated. On this basis, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, composed of delegates from all democratic parties and organizations in China, the People's Liberation Army, people from different regions and nationalities of the country, Chinese living abroad and other patriotic elements, was united.

Representing the entire nation, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was promulgated, electing Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the Central People's Government (…).

At the same time, the Council of the Central People's Government has decided to declare to the governments of all other countries that this government is the only one that represents all the people of the People's Republic of China. This government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is willing to accept the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Beijing, 1or of October 1949.

The People's Republic of China
Central
People's Government Chairman Mao Tsetung

 

Pay attention to the "Chang Kuo-tao" phenomenon

In 1935-36, the Communist Party of China, fighting at an extremely sensitive moment – such as periods of great leaps or serious temporary defeats – in this case, in the middle of the Long March, also confronted a serious political and security situation: one of the leaders, Chang Kuo-tao, had diverted a column acting under his command, changed the march to another course and proclaimed a new one – it was intended, the true one – "central committee". At such a delicate moment, the living forces of the Red Army and the Communist Party of China were threatened with splitting.

According to the notes to the document "Resolution on Certain Problems in the History of Our Party" (Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC, April 1945), "Chang Kuo-tao was a traitor to the Chinese revolution, he joined the Communist Party in the early days of its founding in a willing career. Later he became a renegade. He made numerous mistakes that led him to commit enormous crimes. In 1935 he opposed the Red Army's march north and insisted on his defeatist and liquidationist purpose that the Red Army be thrust into the regions of the national minorities on the borders of Seichuan and Sekiang. At the same time, he openly clashed with the Party and the Central Committee by organizing a false Central Committee under his personal control with the aim of breaking the unity of the Party and the Red Army. These crimes caused great losses to the Party and the Army of the Fourth Front, and its cadres soon regained the correct leadership of the Central Committee, which played a splendid role in the subsequent battles. Chang Kuo-tao did not rectify his mistakes, and in the spring of 1938 he fled alone from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia region and joined the Kuomintang secret service."

But Chang Kuo-tao believed there were good reasons to follow this path.

For Chang Kuo-tao, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the majority of the Central Committee who followed him did not take into account the objectively and subjectively backward conditions of China and "often replaced the objective conditions of China's social development with radical subjective fantasies." He accuses the Party of wanting to make the Revolution when the objective and subjective situation in China, for him, was not favorable. Chang Kuo-tao, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in 1935 in the Maoerkai Mountains, proposed, in a manner consistent with his capitulationist pessimism, that the Long March should be taken to the border with the USSR in northwest China, and accused Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of "empty petty-bourgeois adventurism, without any Marxist scientific understanding", because they maintained that the Long March was a success. fundamentally, and defend going to the North to fight the Japanese; to justify his capitulationist position and make it appear just and correct, he argues that the Chinese northwest was the most backward area of China and, therefore, where support bases could flourish to fight the Japanese, who occupied the other side of China; he again accuses Chairman Mao of being politically incapable and says that "he is used to bragging, saying that the enemy has failed"; attributes to the majority of the Central Committee an exaggerated subjectivism and optimism ("The future of the development of the Soviet movement in China and our present tasks", free translation from Mandarin).

Chang Kuo-tao, as is well known, was unable to convince the majority of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which revolved around Chairman Mao, and committed the crime of dividing the Party and the Red Army with factional activity. Later, he would justify his factional attitude as a response to what he attributes as the "suppression of political discussions" and "accusations and slanders" against his person, criticisms launched by him against Chairman Mao and the CCP; he presented them as a reason for his discouragement. In 1936, it created its own "Central Committee" and attacked Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Party leadership again and again. He justified his factionalism to the cadres under his leadership and Red fighters with emotional and high-sounding references to the future of the Chinese revolution, "threatened" by Mao Tse-tung's adventurism and subjectivism, and in his speeches he extolled the brilliance of his brand new line (see speeches in Marxists.org, in Mandarin). In reality, what he was really doing was, to all intents and purposes, objectively and unquestionably, seriously threatening the continuity of the revolution by blackmailing the Party with its division, in such a delicate situation, attributing to the CPC errors that, in fact, were of its double inability: to convince and to accept to submit to the majority. "Mao, Chu, Zhang and Bo are petty-bourgeois adventurers. When two enemy divisions were wiped out during the four 'siege and annihilation' campaigns, they declared in good tone that the siege campaigns had been completely and utterly annihilated. What is the result? When we are faced with a setback, we fall into the quagmire of pessimism and despair." In this way he intended to justify to his "central committee" his own pessimism and despair, presented as possibilist objectivism, as opposed to the dogmatic "subjectivism" and "sectarianism" of Mao Tsetung.

Defeated even within his new "central committee" by the communist cadre Chu Te, he was forced to return to the Party and make self-criticism. He did so, in public and in writing, in 1937. He admitted and promised to rectify the "insufficient understanding of Marxism-Leninism and my arrogant bad style", reaffirmed his self-criticism, acknowledged that his anti-Party line and attitude were erroneous and unacceptable; "As a soldier of the Central Committee, I do not represent the so-called powerful faction, because this is something I am not willing to do, there is no reason to do it, because I am a member of the Party, a Bolshevik, and I believe that all Party members should not do this, this is not allowed by a Bolshevik Party." But Chang Kuo-tao only manipulated words to betray the Party again. On May 6, 1938, he wrote a document entitled "Letter to the Chinese People and Discussion with the Communist Party of China on Questions Concerning the Anti-Japanese War and the Founding of the Country" (free translation from Mandarin), which is a kind of final balance after having definitively broken and betrayed the CPC, and before becoming an openly agent of the Kuomintang.

In this document, he seeks to reject the criticism of the CPC Central Committee that pointed his capitulationism at the entire Party, assuring that "I have a strong determination to fight the war to the end and a strong confidence that we will win it." It then reproaches Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the CPC for "continuing to slander my views and actions, for such an attitude is nothing but contempt for the truth." Later on, he criticizes the fact that the majority of the Central Committee, who committed the great crime of not agreeing with their opinions at the meetings of the leadership of Tsuny (1935), Maoerkai (1935) and Yenan(1937), because they were "obsessed with their own opinions," "disregarded facts and confused right and wrong in order to suppress political discussions." (Poor thing! Chang Kuo-tao was being persecuted by the "sectarian" Mao Tsetung and his "follow-my" party). He goes further, and even uses the resource of sarcasm: "In this way, it is clear that the leaders of the Communist Party of China do not pay much attention to the self-esteem that members of political parties should have, and pay little attention to ethics in politics. This is something I deeply regret." Believing that he has justified his betrayal with this, he finally defends, in this document, in a more complete way, his rejection of Marxism-Leninism, the denial of the hegemony of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist revolution, the agrarian revolution and unfurls the defense of Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme leader of the Chinese nation. Finally, the finished work of capitulationism.

Criticizing and Crushing the Chang Kuo-tao Phenomenon

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, against whom Chang Kuo-tao rose up, criticized and fought against the deviations of this leader. In the October 1938 document "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," the Central Committee, led by Chairman Mao, characterizes Chang Kuo-tao's right-opportunist, liquidationist and capitulationist line as follows:

"The criterion which the Communist Party applies in its cadre policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, whether or not he observes discipline, whether or not he is closely connected with the masses, whether or not he is able to orient himself in work, whether or not he is active, tenacious and disinterested. (…) Chang Kuo-tao's cadre policy was contrary to this. By making 'appointments according to personal proximity,' he surrounded himself with 'his men' to form a small faction, to such an extent that he eventually betrayed the Party and deserted."

"Anyone who violates the rules of discipline sabotages the unity of the Party. Experience shows us that some break discipline because they do not know what it is, but others, like Chang Kuo-tao, do so in full knowledge of the facts, to satisfy evil desires, taking advantage of the ignorance of many of the Party members."

"As for Chang Kuo-tao's line on organizational questions, it constituted a complete break with all the principles of the Communist Party; it sabotaged discipline and went from factional activity to open opposition to the Party, the Central Committee and the Communist International. The Central Committee did its best to put an end to the criminal errors of its line and its anti-Party activity, even trying to save it. But since he obstinately refused to correct himself and went over to duplicity, and then betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Kuomintang, the Party had to take a firm stand to expel him . . . by declaring him a deserter and a renegade."

"In the fight against deviations, we must strive to combat duplicity, the greatest danger of which is that it may result in factional activity, as Chang Kuo-tao's career proves. To act with duplicity is to submit in public and rebel in private, to say yes and think no, to pronounce beautiful words from the front and intrigue from behind."

The new generation of proletarian revolutionaries must know the "Chang Kuo-tao" type phenomenon in order to raise their vigilance against the upstarts and careerists, shrewd individuals who, like Chang Kuo-tao, have no scruples and no self-restraint and go so far as to seriously threaten the Revolution in order to satisfy evil interests and, like Khrushchev, to pursue hidden objectives. To denounce the "Chang Kuo-tao" type phenomenon and to unfurl, defend and apply Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, especially Maoism, and the contributions of universal validity of Chairman Gonzalo!